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Abstract
I investigate the optimal environmental tax under a policy based on extended producer
responsibility (EPR) in oligopoly markets. I introduce the recycling market and explicitly
consider how these policies affect the incentive for recycling. I derive the optimal tax rule,
which depends on the weighted sum of the markup in the product market and the markdown
in the recycling market. In contrast to the existing works that emphasize that the optimal tax
rate is lower than the marginal external damage, I find that the optimal tax rate can be higher
than the marginal external damage.
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Goods must be disposed of after their consumption. Such disposing activities
are not costless, but traditionally, (local) governments have been disposing of the
post-consumer wastes at no charge to the consumer or producer. This means that
the impact of the disposal cost (including environmental damage) on the economy
is not internalized. It has been pointed out1 that this externality yields excess
production and insuﬃcient recycling, resulting in excess waste disposal. Since the
free public service of waste disposal is the starting point of this externality, the
simplest way of internalization is to directly charge the consumers for the disposal
cost of their consumption, that is, the Pigouvian tax.2 However, it is often diﬃcult
to implement the suﬃcient charge level because of illegal disposal by consumers,3
that is, the tax evasion by exploiting the diﬃculty in monitoring. The concept
of extended producer responsibility (EPR) is proposed as a remedy for this post-
consumer wastes problem. Recently, policymakers have been paying increasing
attention to EPR.4
In this paper, I introduce a policy in which the producers are held liable for the
disposal cost of their production. This policy transfers the ﬁnancial responsibility of
waste management from the local government to the producer, which is a primary
function of EPR. In this policy, the maker of the disposed product is charged
instead of consumer. Thus, the problem of monitoring consumers’ illegal disposal
can be avoided. Furthermore, in the absence of monitoring problems, this EPR
policy and the direct charge on consumers (Pigouvian tax) are equivalent.
Since the makers of disposed products must be monitored, the EPR policy
discussed here will be more suitable under a situation where the industry com-
prises some dominant makers, that is, the market structure in this industry is
monopoly or oligopoly. Barnett (1980) and Misiolek (1980) research how mar-
ket power modiﬁed the Pigouvian tax rule (the second-best Pigouvian tax under
monopoly). However, they treat abatement activities only in emission functions
and do not consider abatement markets such as recycling markets. Calcott and
Walls (2000) incorporate recycling markets explicitly in their models with perfectly
competitive ﬁrms.
I analyze the EPR policy as the second-best Pigouvian tax rule in an oligopoly
model (including monopoly) with a recycling market. As a result, I have the fol-
lowing: First, the optimal Pigouvian tax rate is the marginal external damage
plus the weighted sum of the markup in the product market and the markdown in
the recycling market. Second, this optimal tax rate is higher than the second-best
1See, e.g., Porter (2002) and Fullerton and Wolverton (2000).
2In terms of ordinary environmental economics, wastes and recyclables correspond to emissions
and abatements, respectively. Fullerton and Wolverton (2000) point out and summarize this
correspondence excellently.
3Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) analyze illegal disposal explicitly.
4OECD published a guidance manual about EPR for governments (OECD 2001). According
to this manual, EPR is “a policy approach in which a producer’s responsibility for a product is
extended to the post-consumer stage of a product’s life.”
1Pigouvian tax rate which is induced without considering a recycling market. More-
over, it is possible for the optimal tax rate to exceed even the ﬁrst-best Pigouvian
tax rate, that is, the marginal external damage.
2 The model
Consider an industry where n symmetric ﬁrms supply homogeneous products and
recycle some of the products. The ﬁrms produce the products at a constant
marginal cost of c 2 R+. The products are transacted in the product market
and consumed by households. After consumption, the same amount of wastes as
that of products are generated, and some part of the wastes can be recycled. The
non-recycled consumed products are disposed of directly and generate some ex-
ternal damage (including both external disposal cost and environmental damage)
with a constant marginal external damage of d 2 R++. The recycled products are
transacted in the recycling market and reproduced by producers with a marginal
beneﬁt of b 2 R.5 The ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition in both the product
market and the recycling market; that is, each ﬁrm i (i 2 f1;:::;ng) chooses its
supply of products xi and demand for recycling ri simultaneously.
The total demand for products X and the total supply of recycling R are derived
from the following utility maximization problem of a representative household.
Here, I assume the representative household is a price taker at Px and Pr, which




s.t. PxX + Y + ¿(X ¡ R) + C(R) = I + PrR
where U(X)+Y (Y is the numeraire) is the household’s utility function that takes
the quasi-linear form, which satisﬁes U0 > 0 and U00 < 0; C(R) is the recycling
cost,6 which satisﬁes C0 > 0 and C00 > 0; and I is the given household’s income. ¿
is the unit charge imposed on the household for its direct waste disposal X ¡R. I
assume that all the outcomes (the amounts of products, recycling, and disposal) are
interior solutions, that is, X;R;X ¡R > 0 in the equilibrium. From the ﬁrst order
conditions of the interior solutions, we obtain the inverse demand for products and
the inverse supply of recycling:
Px(X) = U
0(X) ¡ ¿; Pr(R) = C
0(R) ¡ ¿; (1)
5b can be interpreted in various ways. If the ﬁrm sells its recycled materials in some other
market, the market’s price minus the reprocessing cost is the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt. If the ﬁrm uses recy-
cled materials as inputs for its own products, b is the diﬀerence between the price of substitutable
virgin inputs and the reprocessing cost.
6C is interpreted as the transaction cost in the collection process for recycling. Usually,
intermediate traders or recyclers participate in the collection process for the consumed products.
However, for simplicity, I suppose that the entire cost in this process is passed on to households.
If all the markets for intermediate traders are competitive, this supposition is not essential.
2which satisﬁes P 0
x < 0 and P 0
r > 0. Note that from these deﬁnitions of Px and
Pr, we have the relations U00 = P 0
x and C00 = P 0
r. Further, I assume the second
order and stability conditions of the Cournot games, that is, P 0
x + P 00
xx < 0 and
P 0
r + P 00
r r > 0.7
3 The policy based on EPR
3.1 Equivalency
Suppose the unit liability (or the unit penalty) for non-recycled products is equal




















¡ Á(xi ¡ ri): (2)
I focus on the symmetric Nash equilibrium, that is, x = x1;:::;xn and r =




x(nx)x + Px(nx) ¡ c ¡ Á = 0; b + Á ¡ Pr(nr) ¡ P
0
r(nr)r = 0: (3)
Using the deﬁnitions in (1) and the relations U00 = P 0




0(nx) ¡ c ¡ (Á + ¿) = 0; b + (Á + ¿) ¡ C
0(nr) ¡ C
00(nr)r = 0: (4)
The following proposition states that the ﬁrm’s liability for non-recycled prod-
ucts Á and the household’s direct charge for waste disposal ¿ are perfectly substi-
tutable.
Proposition 1 For all policy combinations (Á;¿) such that Á + ¿ has the same
level, all the equilibrium outcomes (the amounts of products, recycling, and dis-
posal) are the same.
Proof. Suppose that x and ¯ x (x < ¯ x) are the equilibrium amounts of products
for the same level of Á + ¿. From (4), Á + ¿ = U00(nx)x + U0(nx) ¡ c must be
satisﬁed for x = x; ¯ x. However, the right hand side is strictly decreasing in x since
U000(nx)x + 2U00(nx) = P 00
x(nx)x + 2P 0
x(nx) < 0. Thus, U00(nx)x + U0(nx) ¡ c >
U00(n¯ x)¯ x+U0(n¯ x)¡c, which is a contradiction. A similar proof can be applicable
for recycling. As for the disposal, since the outcome is deﬁned by x ¡ r, the proof
is clear from the result of the products and recycling. Q.E.D.
7These are the conditions that guarantee that the marginal revenue curves are steeper than
the demand or supply curves.
3Hence, each ﬁrm’s equilibrium output of products and input of recycling are
given by the functions of Á + ¿, that is, x¤(Á + ¿) and r¤(Á + ¿), respectively.






x + P 00








r + P 00
r r) + P 0
r
> 0: (5)
Therefore, the ﬁrm’s liability for non-recycled products Á, as well as the household’s
direct charge for waste disposal ¿, has two eﬀects on the equilibrium waste disposal
x¤¡r¤. In the product market, ﬁrms become aware that they must bear the liability
for each additional unit of their production. This reduces the supply of products
and contributes to the reduction of waste disposal. This is called the “output
reduction eﬀect.” In the recycling market, ﬁrms can avoid the liability for each
additional unit of their recycling. This increases the demand for recycling. Thus,
recycling is encouraged, which results in smaller amounts of waste. This is referred
to as the “input substitution eﬀect.8”
3.2 Second-best policy






















By substituting (4) and using the relations U00 = P 0










= n(b + d) ¡ nC
0 = nP
0
rr ¡ n(Á + ¿ ¡ d): (9)
Let Sx (Sr) denote the share of the output reduction eﬀect (the input substi-




























Note that by deﬁnition, Sx;Sr 2 (0;1) and Sx +Sr = 1. Let ´x and ´r be the price
elasticities of the product’s demand Px=P 0
xnx¤ and the recycling supply Pr=P 0
rnr¤,
respectively. Note that ´x < 0 and ´r > 0. By rearranging (7) using these nota-
tions, we arrive at the following second-best policy.
8Walls (2004) introduced these terms into the economics of waste and recycling.
9I assume that the second order condition is satisﬁed.
4Proposition 2 The optimal policy combination of Á and ¿ satisﬁes that










One unit of waste reduction eliminates the external damage d, but Sx parts
of waste reduction follow the output reduction eﬀect and Sr parts accompany the
input substitution eﬀect. Unit reduction of output expands the welfare loss in the
product market, which is a markup resulting from the monopoly power Px=n´x.10
Thus, the optimal policy level is reduced by (Px=n´x)Sx from the ﬁrst-best level
d. On the other hand, unit recycling encouragement eliminates the welfare loss in
the recycling market, which is a markdown resulting from the monopsony power
Pr=n´r.11 Thus, the optimal policy level must be modiﬁed upward by (Pr=n´r)Sr.
As a result, the second-best level is adjusted by the weighted sum of the markup
in the product market and the markdown in the recycling market, (Px=n´x)Sx +
(Pr=n´r)Sr.
If I suppose that the recycling market is absent from our model, that is, Sx = 1
and Sr = 0, our second-best policy level turns out to be Á+¿ = d+Px=(n´x); when
n = 1, this is consistent with the second-best Pigouvian tax rule under a monopoly
introduced by Misiolek (1980).12 In this case, the second-best Pigouvian tax rate is
always less than the marginal external damage. However, as mentioned above, the
monopsony power in recycling drives the optimal policy level in the other direction.
Hence, it is important to address the question: Which extent the policy level should
be increased to?
Proposition 3 Under the optimal policy combination, (i) when P 00
x ¸ 0 and P 00
r ¸
0, we always have (Px=n´x)Sx + (Pr=n´r)Sr < 0; (ii) otherwise, we can have
(Px=n´x)Sx + (Pr=n´r)Sr > 0.
Proof. First note that (Px=n´x)Sx + (Pr=n´r)Sr = M=j@(x¤ ¡ r¤)=@(Á + ¿)j 7 0
































































< 0 (since x
¤ > r
¤ by the assumption of positive disposal):
10By an appropriate manipulation, we can show that Px ¡ (c + Á) = jPx=n´xj.
11Similarly, we can show that (b + Á) ¡ Pr = jPr=n´rj.
12Barnett (1980) considers a more general situation including abatement activities. For
oligopoly, see Xepapadeas (1997) Chap.5. However, in their model, abatement activities are
treated in emission functions, not in markets. Thus, their analyses are essentially the same with
regard to the conclusion that the second-best Pigouvian tax rate is lower than the marginal
external damage.
5(ii) The following example suﬃces. Suppose n = 1, Px(x) = 2¡x, Pr(r) =
p
r,
b = c = 0 and d = 29=30. Then, x¤ = (2 ¡ (Á + ¿))=2 and r¤ = (2(Á + ¿)=3)2.
Under the optimal policy, x¤ = 1=2, r¤ = 4=9, and Á + ¿ = 1. (See Figures 1
and 2 for illustrations of the optimal case.) Therefore, I have M = 5=108 > 0 and
Á + ¿ > d. Q.E.D.
Note that the case of Proposition (i) includes the linear and the log linear demand
(supply). Thus, as far as the demand (supply) elasticity is estimated in the linear or
the log linear model, the optimal policy level is still less than the marginal external
damage. In this case, the optimal policy level is closer to the ﬁrst-best level than
in the case where the monopsony recycling market is not considered. However,
more generally, this level can be increased further. Proposition (ii) indicates that
if the ﬁrms also have market power in the abatement markets, the Pigouvian tax
rate can exceed the marginal external damage.
3.3 Monitoring problem
As for waste reduction, Á and ¿ produce the same two eﬀects. However, the two
policies are diﬀerent when we consider the monitoring problem. When the con-
sumers are charged, we must monitor who discharged the wastes. However, this is
often diﬃcult because it is possible for consumers to evade their charge by dispos-
ing of their wastes illegally. On the other hand, when the producers are charged
(or penalized), the disposal cost for one ﬁrm’s product is always charged on this
ﬁrm regardless of who has consumed it. Thus, we can implement this policy merely
by monitoring which ﬁrm’s production the disposed wastes are. In particular, in
an oligopoly industry, the products will not be anonymous.13 Therefore, when the
monitoring problem is considered, EPR not only works as well as, but can also be
superior to the household’s direct charge for waste disposal.
Note that our analysis does not exclude the case that Á and ¿ are mixed. In
reality, it is observed that local governments charge consumers for waste disposal
services. However, the monitoring problem usually prevents the governments from
implementing the suﬃcient charge level for the disposal cost. The EPR policy can
also be used to ﬁll the gap between the optimal and practical levels of charge on
consumers.
4 Concluding remarks
Using an oligopoly model incorporating the recycling market, I have discussed how
the optimal EPR policy modiﬁes the Pigouvian tax rule. I ﬁnd that the optimal
Pigouvian tax level is modiﬁed by the weighted sum of the markup in the product
market and the markdown in the recycling market and that it is possible for this
tax level to exceed the marginal external damage.
13This is more plausible if the products exhibit some product diﬀerentiation, However, in this
paper, I have not focus on this aspect for simplicity.
6In this paper, I have restricted attention to the downstream policies, which
are essentially taxes on waste disposal. Theoretically, an upstream deposit-refund
policy, which is also regarded as an EPR-suitable policy, has been discussed as an
ideal policy to internalize the disposal cost and avoid the monitoring problem.14
Thus, it is worth deriving the optimal deposit-refund policy in oligopoly and com-
paring it with the downstream policies. The deposit-refund policy has two policy
instruments that can separately cope with the two market failures resulting from
monopoly power: tax in the product market and subsidy in the recycling market.
Therefore, even if we do not consider the monitoring problem, the upstream policy
will be superior to the downstream policies with respect to eﬃciency. However,
even so, our downstream-EPR policy has some advantages. First, this policy pro-
vides an incentive to ﬁrms to urge the home reduction of wastes15 by focusing on
aspects such as long-term usage or reusability. Second, the administration cost of
this policy can be lower than that of the deposit-refund policy.16 A formal analysis
of these points remains for future research.
14See, e.g. Dinan (1993), Palmer and Walls (1997) and Fullerton and Wolverton (2000). These
papers analyze the deposit-refund system under perfect competition.
15Choe and Fraser (1999) discuss that the deposit-refund policy fails to encourage the home
reduction of wastes.
16For example, our downstream-EPR policy is feasible for local governments, while the deposit-
refund policy is diﬃcult to implement since some product and recycling markets can be in other
jurisdictions.
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Figure 1: Optimal case of the example. MRx is the marginal revenue curve of





Figure 2: Equilibrium welfare of the example.
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